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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses parallels between our current recession and the Great Depression for the intelligent
general public.  It stresses the role of economic models and ideas in public policy and argues that gold-standard
mentality still holds sway today.  The parallels are greatest in the generation of the crises, and they
also illuminate the policy choices being made today.  We have escaped a repeat of the Depression,
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John Maynard Keynes wrote in the depths of the Great Depression that, “Practical 
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are 
usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”
1  This acute observation is applicable to 
our current Great Recession as well.  In fact, the newly discredited ideas are not too 
different from the old, suggesting that Keynes may have overestimated the ability of 
people to learn from their mistakes. 
I discuss the parallels between these two watersheds in recent economic history in 
three steps.  The first and most important step is the causes of the crises and their relation 
to economic theory.  The second step is the spread of the crises as they affected the whole 
world.  I close with the final step, recovery—at least as far as we can see it at this point.  
Marx said famously that history repeats itself, “the first time as tragedy, the second as 
farce.”
2  I argue that this observation also fits our current condition. 
Both of these dramatic and costly economic crises came from the interaction of 
economic imbalances in the world economy and the ruling ideology of financial decision 
makers who confronted these imbalances.  The first imbalance came from the First World 
War.  This paroxysm of violence brought the long economic expansion of the nineteenth 
century to a sudden end.  Britain, the workshop of the prewar world, was exhausted by 
the struggle.  America, the rising economic behemoth, was unready to take responsibility 
for its new role in the international economy.  Germany, having unsuccessfully 
challenged the Anglo Saxon powers, refused to acknowledge its defeat. 
  1The easiest way to see the imbalance is through the international movement of 
capital.  There were many reasons why this imbalance was allowed to grow over the 
postwar decade, and one of the most important was the ruling economic theory of the 
Gold Standard.  David Hume explained in the eighteenth century how currencies valued 
in gold would maintain stable values relative to each other.  Assume there is a shock to 
one country that decreases its exports.  This will result in an outflow of gold according to 
Hume, which will lower prices in the exporting country.  Lower prices then will 
encourage exports and decrease imports, leading to an inflow of gold.  Prices will rise 
again, recreating the previous equilibrium.  This is known among economists as the 
“price specie-flow mechanism.” 
Hume’s contribution is still useful today, although we now realize how many 
assumptions need to be made in order for it to work as described.  In particular, prices 
have to be determined in competitive markets and fully flexible for this simple process to 
operate.  These assumptions have become characteristic of economic models in the years 
since Hume wrote, and they express a view of the economy often attributed to Adam 
Smith and taught in introductory economics classes.  They are the starting point for many 
journal articles and referred to as perfectly competitive markets.  When they cross the 
line between descriptive and normative conditions, however, they are transformed from 
description—which may or may not be accurate—to prescription—which in turn affects 
public policy. 
These conditions may have been fulfilled in the eighteenth century, but they were 
not accurate in the postwar world of the 1920s.  Central bankers thought themselves 
responsible for inflation and deflation in contrast to Hume’s assumption of a fixed link 
  2between gold flows and prices.  Business firms had become larger, and many product 
markets were no longer fully competitive.  And as the size of producing units, whether 
mines or factories, became larger, the ability of labor markets to be fully competitive 
diminished also.  When an employer was large, individuals had little bargaining power 
over their wages and working conditions.  If an employer was the only large employer in 
town, the options for workers were even more limited and the market power of the 
employer more obvious.  Workers formed unions to present countervailing market power 
to the employers, and wage bargaining and strikes supplanted the individual wage 
negotiations implicit in Hume’s and Smith’s analyses.   
Nevertheless, policy makers after the Great War could think of no better way to 
reorganize the international economy than to restore the Gold Standard, that is, to fix one 
price (the exchange rate) while assuming all others were flexible.  Freezing exchange 
rates in this fashion reduced the ability of countries to adapt to new conditions, but it was 
deemed preferable to the anticipated chaos of alternative arrangements.  The attempt to 
reduce prices in England to sustain the value of Sterling resulted in a general strike, 
showing both how inaccurate the underlying assumptions were and the strength of 
economic policy based on these assumptions. 
The United States took over the position of leading international lender in this 
context and exported massive amounts of capital to Germany in the 1920s.  The loans 
ostensibly were to help Germany maintain the gold value of its currency, and they 
enabled Weimar Germany to both pay reparations owed to the victors in the Great War 
and have a consumption boom.  Higher prices after the war also put strain on gold 
currencies, and England and Germany struggled as a result while economists in the 
  3United States proclaimed the advent of a new economy in which stability and prosperity 
would continue indefinitely.  Hindsight suggests that these conditions were not 
sustainable and the questions were not how to enjoy the new economy but rather how to 
get a soft rather than a hard landing from the high-flying results of the previous shocks. 
Economic troubles appeared in Germany and the United States in the late 1920s.  
Germany’s consumption growth produced a boom in municipal expenditures that began 
to fizzle; the United States had booms in both housing and stocks that ended badly.  
Recessions spread from these countries to others.  International trade decreased, but 
prices could not fall rapidly enough to equilibrate markets in the fashion Hume described.  
Prices were sticky, and unemployment rather than deflation was the result of a lack of 
foreign reserves.  When all countries found their exports falling, the processes of 
deflation and depression chased a moving target.
3 
A similar international imbalance developed after the end of the Cold War, with 
the countries reversed.  Instead of being the new world lender, the United States became 
the new world borrower.  And a “loser” in the cold war, China, developed into the 
primary lender to the U.S.  Even without the benefit of hindsight, economists knew that 
this imbalance was unsustainable and asked if there would be a soft or hard landing.  As 
the inflow of capital to Weimar Germany had fueled expansion, the inflow of Asian 
capital financed a consumption boom in the United States that developed into a housing 
boom.   
This global imbalance was apparent, and economists wondered if it would cause a 
crisis.  The United States is no longer on the Gold Standard, and the value of the dollar 
can change freely from day to day.  The debate was whether there would be a smooth 
  4decline in the value of the dollar after the fashion of the price specie-flow mechanism or 
an abrupt fall.  These worries were misplaced; the crisis in the interwar years was 
precipitated by short-run booms and busts, even though the international imbalance 
created conditions for it.  One such boom in the 1920s was in housing expenditures.  It 
was only a minor player in the drama of the Great Depression, but it had a starring role in 
our current crisis. 
The housing boom flourished in recent years, nourished by the availability of 
Chinese capital and the ruling economic theory of the Washington Consensus.  This term 
indicated a set of economic policies that ranged from stable exchange rates and 
responsible fiscal policies to deregulation and privatization.
4  It was an adaptation of the 
Gold Standard to current conditions, stipulating stable instead of fixed exchange rates to 
avoid the rigidities of the Gold Standard that were so harmful in the 1930s.  Other 
requirements spelled out the conditions assumed under the Gold Standard in the era of 
large governments that followed the Great Depression and the Second World War.  The 
government should stay out of the way so that private finance and industry could prosper 
in this theory; competition would ensure continued growth and prosperity.  Like the Gold 
Standard, the Washington Consensus was based on the enlightenment ideas of Hume and 
Smith and promulgated as a way to organize the postwar world.  It was the economic 
component of the New World Order that the first President Bush was looking for. 
More explicitly than the Gold Standard mentality, the Washington Consensus 
spelled out the conditions needed to maintain stable exchange rates.  It acknowledged that 
most economies in the later twentieth century did not resemble the eighteenth century 
conditions analyzed by Hume and Smith, and it argued that policies designed to recreate 
  5these earlier conditions would lead to economic growth and prosperity.  Using familiar 
theories of competition and flexible prices, the underlying theory showed how the 
competitive process of allocating resources in individual markets would generate stable 
conditions for society as a whole. 
Banks and associated businesses in the United States extended the underlying 
reasoning to the creation of new assets known collectively as derivatives.  The 
Washington Consensus as a whole was a way to reduce risk, and derivatives were a way 
to allocate risks to those investors who wanted to take it on.  Just as banks can hold 
fractional reserves on the assumption that people draw on their deposits randomly and 
independently, these innovators reasoned that home owners default on mortgages 
randomly and independently.  Derivatives are a way to benefit from the fact that only a 
few homeowners default in any given time, so that most mortgages are safe.  Combining 
mortgages into “tranches,” banks could separate the safe part of mortgages from the risky 
parts without knowing which mortgages would be defaulted—just as banks do not know 
which deposits will be withdrawn but can safely assume that only a fraction will be 
withdrawn at any given time. 
Based on the ability to sell mortgages to the creators of derivatives, mortgage 
brokers expanded, encouraged home ownership and promoted the Ownership Society of 
the second President Bush.  But when the resulting housing boom burst and many 
mortgages failed, the assumption that defaults occurred randomly and independently 
turned out to be false.  Derivatives were much more risky than they had appeared to be, 
and the separation of risky and safe assets was not valid.
5  Investors refused to buy any of 
  6them, and credit markets seized up.  Countries that had adopted the policies of the 
Washington Consensus found themselves in a world-wide financial crisis. 
The Great Depression and the Great Depression thus were both caused by policies 
deriving from nostalgia for the world of the Enlightenment.  Drawing on theories from 
the eighteenth century, hard-headed policy makers either assumed or tried to recreate the 
idealized conditions of Hume and Smith.  These policy makers ignored both the growth 
of economies of scale in modern economies and the work of behavioral economists who 
have shown that people do not behave as homo economicus.  The results of their efforts 
in the 1920s and in recent decades was to produce the new economy of the earlier period 
and the goldilocks economy of the later one that turned into booms and busts.  Was it 
inevitable that these economic expansions would end badly? Minsky said it was, that 
people become more complacent with prosperity and willing to take on risks they often 
know are highly suspect.
6  Reinhart and Rogoff more recently used historical evidence to 
agree that booms typically precede financial crises, just as pride goes before a fall.
7 
More formally, people in both expansions miscalculated the risks they faced.  
Their models were based on shocks to individual countries or homeowners; there was no 
allowance for collective actions.  The Gold Standard model explained how to deal with a 
shock to an individual country, implicitly assuming that other countries were immune to 
whatever disturbance affected this individual country.  The interaction between these two 
quite different countries led back to stability, but a collective shock to lots of economies 
was not considered.  The model behind the Washington Consensus similarly considered 
individual risks.  Derivatives were valued as if the underlying risk of mortgage 
foreclosure was the result of random and independent shocks to individual homeowners.  
  7As in the Gold Standard, no consideration was given to collective shocks.  As long as 
house prices continued to rise, this assumption appeared fine.  Random homeowners got 
into trouble and defaulted on their mortgages, and the randomness of defaults enabled 
derivative designers to reduce the risk to any security by diversification, that is, 
combining many mortgages the same way a bank combines many bank deposits.  When 
the housing boom ended and house prices fell, however, many homeowners began to 
default, and the risk that was supposed to be diversified away was now present in 
derivatives previously thought to be risk free.  No investor knew which derivative was 
more at risk, and the prices of all derivatives fell.  Some prices fell so rapidly that there 
were no buyers at all for them.  Financial markets froze in September 2008. 
The second step of this comparison is the spread of the crisis.  Countries in the 
early 1930s were pursuing a moving target as they all contracted in an effort to deal with 
what looked to each of them as budget and current-account deficits.  The result was a 
series of currency crises in the summer and fall of 1931 that turned a bad recession into 
the Great Depression.  The German mark collapsed when the chancellor put domestic 
politics ahead of sensible finance.
8  The English Pound went off gold after a subsequent 
speculative attack.  And the American Federal Reserve raised its discount rate 
dramatically in October 1931 to preserve the value of the dollar even though the economy 
was contracting at a rapid rate.  The Fed kicked the American economy when it was 
down and drove the economy further into depression. 
Many countries continued to maintain deflationary policies in the early 1930s as 
they tried to hold onto the Gold Standard or—in the case of Germany—followed its 
prescriptions even after abandoning the Gold Standard.  Some countries followed 
  8England off gold and created room for expansive policies, but they were not large or 
expansive enough to stimulate recovery in other countries still in thrall to gold.  It has 
become common to attribute the continued economic decline to banking crises, but banks 
only failed in countries on the Gold Standard.
9  As long as countries set policies to 
maintain the value of their currency, their banks were at risk; bank failures were a 
damaging part of the depression, not its cause.  Governments and central bankers—not 
commercial banks—led the way into depression in country after country. 
This process is shown well by the U.S. experience.  Banks continued to fail as the 
government clung to the Gold Standard.  The Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
refused to help a prominent Michigan bank holding company in early 1933 for reasons 
that are not clear, anticipating the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008.  States declared 
bank holidays, and the New York Federal Reserve Bank lost gold as investors speculated 
against the dollar.  Roosevelt, taking office in early March 1933, immediately instituted 
what he called a federal bank holiday to keep the banking system from complete 
collapse.
10 
Banks and other private financial institutions were the center of the financial 
panic that initiated the Great Recession.  Banks and other financial institutions had 
accumulated large portfolios of mortgage-backed securities, where mortgages were 
combined and then separated—at least in theory—into securities of differing risks.  When 
the housing boom ended in 2006 and 2007, home owners began to default on mortgages 
at an increasing rate.  These defaults were not the random defaults assumed in the 
construction of mortgage-based securities, and investors could no longer tell the various 
  9derivatives apart.  Efficiency-promoting securities were transformed into toxic assets as it 
became progressively harder to sell them.  
Tightness in American and European financial markets caused by the inability to 
sell these toxic assets was apparent in the summer of 2007.  Pressure continued during the 
fall, and the Fed lowered its discount rate by more than a percentage point between 
September and the following January.  (The National Bureau of Economic Research later 
concluded that a recession had started in December 2007.)  Fed Chairman Bernanke, 
Treasury Secretary Paulson, and President of the New York Fed Geithner rescued the 
New York investment house of Bear Stearns at the point of collapse with Fed funds and 
purchase by another investment house in March 2008, and they took over the two quasi-
governmental mortgage brokers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in August.  Even at this 
late date, the Fed and other public figures argued that the pressure was largely limited to 
the housing sector and that the measures taken so far were sufficient to maintain financial 
health. 
Bernanke and Paulson asserted after the fact that they tried to get Congress to take 
action to forestall a crisis in the summer of 2008.  This effort proved futile for several 
reasons.  The financial leaders were making reassuring statements to the public at the 
same time they were appealing to Congress.  This mixed message did not lend 
persuasiveness to any arguments they presented.  In addition, Congress was not 
convinced that the financial system was on the verge of a meltdown and was reluctant to 
act outside of an emergency.  This probably is a general problem: it is hard to prepare for 
a hypothetical crisis without having evidence that it is about to emerge.  And of course if 
palliative action forestalls the putative crisis, people ask what all the pressure was about.  
  10Congress is a large and unwieldy body; all these complexities precluded preventive 
action in the summer of 2008. 
In September another investment house, Lehman Brothers, found itself unable to 
borrow.  It tried selling assets to pay its obligations but could not sell its toxic assets and 
fell short of its needs.  Creditors wanted to be paid and investors wanted to sell Lehman’s 
stock.  Although an investment rather than a commercial bank, Lehman was in a process 
that resembled nothing so much as an old-fashioned banking panic.  Bernanke, Paulson, 
and Geithner could not repeat their rescue of Bear Stearns and allowed Lehman to fail on 
September 15, 2008.  None of these articulate policy makers was able to tell a coherent 
story after the fact why they had not avoided Lehman’s bankruptcy. This reprised the 
government confusion that led Michigan banks to fail in early 1933, precipitating the 
bank holiday. 
The financial triumvirate had tried to find a buyer for Lehman as they had done 
for Bear Stearns but were unable to do so.  They apparently reverted to the Gold Standard 
mentality as expressed in the free-market ideology of the Washington Consensus; 
Lehman had taken large risks and now had to pay the penalty for losing too many bets.  
But hard on the heels of Lehman came AIG.  Not even an investment bank, this 
multinational insurance company also had taken too many bets on what were now toxic 
assets and was about to collapse.  The epidemic had escaped the mortgage market and 
infected the whole financial system.  We were in what Mishkin, a member of the Fed’s 
Board of Governors had called an “adverse feedback loop” almost a year earlier.
11  One 
failure induced another; we were in a world-wide financial panic. 
  11Paulson, et al., threw in the towel and nationalized AIG.  Their commitment to the 
free market had lasted one day; Congressman Barney Frank suggested we call it Free 
Market Day!
12  But while the sale of Bear Stearns had calmed the financial markets, the 
nationalization of AIG—coming on the heels of Lehman’s bankruptcy—only confused 
the market.  The government had restated its ideals and then abandoned them in the 
twinkling of an eye.  Investors could not predict what would come next.
13 
Credit markets that were barely functioning seized up completely.  No one knew 
what the government policy was or if anyone was insured; no one wanted to purchase 
toxic assets.  Economic activity came to a sudden halt.  International trade fell off a cliff.  
The brief reassertion of faith in the free market in 2008 was as counter productive as 
fidelity to the Gold Standard had been in 1931.  Now as then, the United States dragged 
the world down with it—faster than fifty years earlier.
14 
Fortunately, we are now in a great recession, not a repeat of the Great Depression.  
We have 10 percent unemployment and unemployment insurance instead of 20 percent 
without a safety net.  The primary reason for this divergence is the vagary of the 
American political cycle.  Voters had to wait three years after the Great Depression began 
and a full year after the Fed turned a recession into a depression to vote on public policy, 
but voters in 2008 had this opportunity just months after the financial crisis began.  The 
similarity between now and then is that it took a new group of leaders to change policy.  
The Obama administration has many holdovers, and Obama has reappointed Bernanke as 
Fed Chairman, but there is no doubt that the theories underlying the policy are now 
different than they were in the last administration.  One difference between now and then 
  12is that—since this is only a recession—Obama does not have the opportunity for reform 
that Roosevelt did. 
Roosevelt opened most banks quickly after their holiday, and he took the United 
States off gold a month later.  He introduced the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NILR) and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), pillars of the New Deal, shortly 
thereafter.  This complex of actions signaled a clear new direction in government policy, 
what economists call a new policy regime.  Investment rose and consumption began to 
recover; the long economic decline had ended.
15 
It has become common to blame the continuation of high unemployment in the 
1930s on high wages created by the NIRA and subsequent growth of unions.  This is 
wrong for several reasons.  Economic growth was exceedingly rapid during Roosevelt’s 
first term.  It probably could not have been faster due to bottlenecks in the supply of raw 
materials and production.  Faster growth, even if possible, probably would have led to 
inflation despite the high unemployment.
16  In fact, the recovery was so fast that both the 
Fed and the government decided to reverse policy and rein in demand by both monetary 
and fiscal policies.  The result was the recession of 1937 which increased unemployment 
and delayed the return to full employment for several more years.  Labor’s gains in the 
Depression were not the cause of its continuation. 
  The growth of unions was only one of the results of the New Deal, Roosevelt’s 
blizzard of reforms to the prostrate economy.  Not all of these reforms were consistent 
with each other, and not all of them lasted more than a few years.  The enduring parts of 
the New Deal however changed the economy in many ways.  Labor and tax reforms 
preserved a stable income distribution in the economic expansion that followed the 
  13Second World War.  Creation of the FDA led to the expansion of the pharmaceutical 
industry that extended life for many people, and Social Security made the lives of older 
people vastly more pleasant.   
Reforms to the financial system led to a half-century free of financial crises.  The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) freed most people from worry about the 
safety of their bank accounts.  This insurance was complemented by bank regulation to 
substitute for critical investors and depositors.  Commercial and investment banks were 
separated from each other in the Glass-Steagall Act.  The Federal Reserve System was 
restructured to make its central office more powerful, and the Security Exchange 
Commission (SEC) was created to regulate financial investments.  Banking became a 
boring industry, and more people invested safely in the stock market.  There was not a lot 
of excitement in the financial markets, and the economy grew rapidly and consistently 
after the war. 
  Nothing lasts forever, and prosperity generated a desire for more independent 
financial dealings.  Economic turmoil in the 1970s hastened the transition, and the 
Washington Consensus arose in the 1980s.  The Glass-Steagall Act was repealed, and the 
SEC became more relaxed.  Americans urged the rest of the world to follow suit and 
deregulate both domestic and foreign capital movements.  The distribution of income 
widened, the size of the financial sector rose, and there began to be a string of small-scale 
(at least to the United States) financial crises. 
  This foreshadowing of our current problems was not seen as such at the time, 
even the failures of Long Term Capital Markets (LTCM) in 1998 and of Enron in 2001.  
Most of the crises, like the Asian crises of 1997 (which spread to Russia, bringing down 
  14LTCM), were seen as problems of less developed countries, not mature economies like 
the United States.  Economists and politicians alike pushed for less regulation at home 
and deregulation abroad.  They particularly sought to deregulate the international flow of 
capital and hailed the Washington Consensus as the way forward for all countries, 
developing and developed.  They were like Irving Fisher, a great economist of the early 
20
th century who believed his models too much and predicted continued prosperity just 
before the Great Depression.
17 
  Even Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve and student of the Great 
Depression did not see chaos ahead during most of 2008.  Bernanke, to his credit, 
realized what was happening by the start of 2009.  He resolved not let the Fed duplicate 
its mistakes of the early 1930s, standing by as banks failed and supporting the gold 
standard instead of the domestic economy.  He pulled all the strings—some of them on 
the outer edge of his authority—to loosen monetary policy and encourage economic 
activity.  It was a bravura performance, but monetary policy had lost its effectiveness as 
banks ran for safety even after the financial panic subsided.  The banks used the Fed’s 
services to rebuild their depleted reserves as the value of toxic assets went to zero, and 
they loaned only to the safest of customers.
18 
  Obama, even before he took office, urged Congress to pass a stimulus bill—to 
create a fiscal expansion in addition to the hobbled monetary expansion.  Republican 
congressmen made him divert part of the stimulus to tax cuts, which went into savings as 
people—like banks—tried to build up their depleted reserves, limiting the size of the 
stimulus.  This fidelity to the Washington Consensus reduced Obama’s ability to 
moderate the effects of the recession on ordinary people. 
  15  Expansive monetary and fiscal policies were effective enough to keep us from a 
repetition of the Great Depression, and support for reforms on the order of the New Deal 
ebbed.  Obama had campaigned on a program of bipartisan cooperation, and he tried to 
bring Republicans along with his policies.  They had not abandoned their belief in the 
Washington Consensus, and banks—newly prosperous again due to government bail-
outs—resisted increased regulation.  Obama put extending health care to all Americans 
before reforming the financial system, and the window for the latter appears to have 
closed. 
  There are two lessons to be drawn from this comparison.  The first is that the open 
American economy is prone to collapse every once and a while.  Favorable conditions—
the New Deal and a vigorous post-war expansion—can eliminate “great” economic 
contractions for a generation or so, but American exuberance appears to chafe under 
these conditions.  As the memory of past economic difficulties fades, economic and 
political pressure for change rises to the fore.  International economic imbalances are 
condoned until they have to be corrected, often painfully. 
  The second lesson is that there are strong pressures for unregulated capitalism that 
only abate in the face of sharp economic downturns like the Great Depression.  We 
avoided another Great Depression by luck—the election cycle—and skill.  Marx was 
correct when he argued that tragic history repeats itself as farce: we now have the 
oxymoronic Great Recession after all the fears of Great Depression II.  Keynes was right 
too; discredited economic theories—and the Gold Standard mentality—will continue to 
dominate the actions of even “practical” men and women.
19  Recent policy initiatives 
appear to have done little to reduce the underlying risk of another financial crisis. 
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